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The Right to Be Forgotten v. Free Speech 
EDWARD LEE* 
 From the moment the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) handed down its landmark decision on May 13, 2014, 
recognizing a right to be forgotten (RTBF), commentators from the 
United States cast the decision at odds with the freedom of speech.1 
Granting people a right to remove links to old stories about them from 
Google searches of their names violates the freedom of speech, 
commentators warned. Indeed, critics blasted the decision as blatant 
censorship.2 The cries of censorship escalated when France’s data 
protection authority subsequently ordered Google to extend its 
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1 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Costeja, 2014 E.C.R. I-317, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&pageIndex=0
&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1033117 . For commentary, see, e.g., 
Craig Timberg & Sarah Halzack, Right to Be Forgotten v. Free Speech, WASH. POST, May 
14, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/right-to-be-forgotten-
vsfreespeech/ 2014 /05/14/53c9154c-db9d-11e3-bda1-9b46b2066796_story.html; Lisa 
Fleisher, Google Ruling: Freedom of Speech v. The Right to Be Forgotten, WALL ST. J., 
May 13, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/05/13/eu-court-google-decision-freedom-
of-speech-vs-right-to-be-forgotten/; see also Robert Krulwich, Is The ‘Right to Be 
Forgotten’ The ‘Biggest Threat to Free Speech on The Internet’?, NPR, Feb. 24, 2012, 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/krulwich/2012/02/23/147289169/is-the-right-to-be-forgotten-
the-biggest-threat-to-free-speech-on-the-internet. 
2 See, e.g., Marcus Wohlsen, For Google, the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Is an Unforgettable 
Fiasco, WIRED, July 3, 2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/07/google-right-to-be-
forgotten-censorship-is-an-unforgettable-fiasco/ (“The censorship of news articles under 
the abuse of the “right to be forgotten” is just a much more blatant reminder of that 
fungibility—a reminder that Google would clearly like everyone to just forget.”). 
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removal of links globally to any Google site (not just its European 
sites) that can be accessed in the EU. Initially, Google refused to 
comply with the French order on the ground that “no one country 
should have the authority to control what content someone in a 
second country can access.”3 Other critics of the French order were 
even more alarmist: “If Google is forced to comply with the EU rules 
globally, the result would be unprecedented censorship of Internet 
content worldwide, as well as a dangerous expansion of foreign 
regulators’ control over what Americans can see on the Web.”4  
 The media portrayed this conflict as a clash of two individual 
rights—the right to be forgotten or, more generally, the right to 
privacy versus the freedom of speech. The conventional wisdom was 
that Europe and the United States take opposite approaches in 
resolving this conflict: “In Europe, the right to privacy trumps 
freedom of speech; the reverse is true in the United States.”5  
 This pithy account of the right to be forgotten is flawed. It masks a 
far more diverse set of responses countries can adopt in trying to 
reconcile the potential conflict between the right to be forgotten and 
the freedom of speech.6 Indeed, in the European Union, the CJEU 
decision has been applied in a far more nuanced way—not as an 
automatic trump, but with free speech interests prevailing in the 
3 Sam Shechner, Google Appeals French Order to Apply ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Globally, 
WALL ST. J., July 30, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-appeals-french-order-to-
apply-right-to-be-forgotten-globally-1438273521 (quoting Peter Fleischer, Google’s global 
privacy counsel). 
4 James L. Gattuso, Europe’s Latest Export: Internet Censorship, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 
2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/europes-latest-export-internet-censorship-
1439333404. 
5 See Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 29, 2014, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion; see also Charles 
Arthur, Explaining the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’—the Newest Cultural Shibboleth, THE 
GUARDIAN, May 14, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/14/explainer-right-to-be-forgotten-
the-newest-cultural-shibboleth. 
6 The scope of removal of a link on Google—EU only or worldwide access—is undeniably a 
major issue that could heighten the conflict of rights. If Google is required to offer EU 
citizens a worldwide removal of a link, that expansion would exacerbate the conflict with 
the freedom of speech by creating negative spillovers, possibly resulting in an undue 
diminishment of speech for others outside of the EU. However, in February 2016, Google 
appeared to have worked out a possible fix—applying the removals of links on Google.com 
for searches conducted in the EU, but not for searches conducted outside of the EU. See 
Barr & Shechner, infra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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majority of right-to-be-forgotten requests made to Google.7 In 
February 2016, Google agreed to comply with the French order in a 
compromise under which Google would remove links from searches 
across all of its websites (including Google.com) if the search was 
conducted in an EU country, but the searches on Google.com 
conducted outside of the EU would still have access to the removed 
links in searches of the affected person’s name.8 Google’s solution 
appears to avoid the “unprecedented censorship” fears voiced by 
critics of the French order. Different solutions can be devised in other 
countries. Even if a U.S. court one day concludes that free speech 
trumps a right to be forgotten in the United States, the First 
Amendment is no bar to voluntary industry practices (such as movie 
ratings and rape shield policies to protect the identities of rape 
victims).9 Indeed, Google has already adopted a voluntary—and 
sensible—policy recognizing what is akin to a right to be forgotten for 
victims of revenge porn in the United States.10  
 This Essay examines the problem raised when two individual 
rights conflict—here, the right to be forgotten and the freedom of 
speech. Building on the literature that analyzes conflicts between 
individual rights in other contexts,11 Part I examines the nature of the 
conflict between the right to be forgotten and the freedom of speech. 
Part II then maps out alternative ways in which the conflict may be 
resolved. The resolution includes a broad spectrum of options: (1) 
categorical trumps favoring one right over the other, (2) rebuttable 
presumptions in favor of one right, (3) catalogs of situations that favor 
one right over the other, and (4) multi-factor balancing and other 
case-by-case decision making. Each of these approaches can be 
adopted into law by a country, or, alternatively, in voluntary policies 
7 As of August 19, 2015, Google granted the removal of 41.4% of 1,080,162 links requested 
for removal, while rejecting 58.6%. See Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests 
for Search Removals, GOOGLE (last visited Aug. 19, 2015).  
8 See Alistair Barr & Sam Shechner, Google Bends to European Pressure on Right to be 
Forgotten Rule, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-bends-to-
european-pressure-on-right-to-be-forgotten-rule-1455231966. 
9 See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra note 68 and accompanying text. 
11 See e.g., Douglas Laycock, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Religious 
Schools, 60 TEX. L. REV. 259 (1982) (equal protection and free exercise of religion); Rodney 
Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking 
in Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099 (2002) (privacy and free speech).  
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by companies like Google and Microsoft that provide search engines 
to the public. The broad range of options available to countries and 
companies shows that, even in countries where the freedom of speech 
is deemed to not permit a legal right to be forgotten, companies can 
still recognize such a right as a private type of right in their voluntary 
policies. Part III then recommends that Google adopt an incremental 
approach for the United States: granting in its user policy a limited 
right to be forgotten, such as for victims of certain crimes (e.g., rape, 
incest, domestic violence, kidnapping, sex trafficking, etc.), and 
continuing to study whether other circumstances warrant a limited 
right to be forgotten. The incremental approach can also incorporate 
less-restrictive remedies, such as de-ranking search results over time 
instead of completely removing them. 
I. THE EU RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
 This Part explains the landmark decision of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union that recognized a right to be forgotten and the 
controversy it sparked. The major concern among critics of the 
decision is that it will lead to censorship of information on the 
Internet by making it difficult, if not impossible, to find relevant 
articles associated with a person. 
A. The Decision 
 The EU right to be forgotten was first recognized in a 2014 case 
brought by Mario Costeja Gonzalez, who filed a complaint with 
Spain’s Data Protection Agency (Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de 
Datos or AEPD), which administers the EU Data Protection Directive 
in Spain.12 A Google search of his name resulted in links to two pages 
12 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Costeja, 2014 E.C.R. I-317, at ¶ 14, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&pageIndex=0
&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1033117. Some have suggested that 
the right to be forgotten has historical antecedents in sixteenth century dueling codes and 
laws in Europe, which enabled people to defend their honor (such as from embarrassing 
facts) by challenging another person to a duel. See Tom Gara, The Origins of the ‘Right to 
be Forgotten’: Sir, I Demand a Duel, WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2014, 4:00 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-intelligence/2014/05/14/the-origins-of-the-right-to-be-
forgotten-sir-i-demand-a-duel/; Caroline Winter, Dueling Gives Way to ‘Right to Be 
Forgotten’ on Google, SFGATE (May 18, 2014, 4:10 PM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/technology/article/Dueling-gives-way-to-right-to-be-forgotten-
on-5487814.php; Caroline Winter, Dueling, Google, and the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 16, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-
05-16/dueling-google-and-the-right-to-be-forgotten. 
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of the Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia from January 19, 1998 and 
March 9, 1998, which included a public notice of an auction of 
Costeja’s house due to his failure to pay social security debts.13 Costeja 
claimed that the continuing publication of these old articles about him 
violated his privacy right under the Directive because “the attachment 
proceedings . . . had been fully resolved for a number of years and that 
reference to them was now entirely irrelevant.”14 He asked Google 
Spain and Google to remove the links from searches of his name and 
also asked the newspaper to remove the articles containing the public 
notice of the auction.15  
 On May 13, 2014, the CJEU rendered its landmark decision.16 The 
CJEU ruled in favor of Costeja on his claim against Google, but 
rejected his claim against the newspaper. The Court outlined what has 
become popularly known as a right to be forgotten:  
[I]f it is found, following a request by the data subject 
pursuant to Article 12(b) of Directive 95/46, that the 
inclusion in the list of results displayed following a 
search made on the basis of his name of the links to 
web pages published lawfully by third parties and 
containing true information relating to him personally 
is, at this point in time, incompatible with Article 
6(1)(c) to (e) of the directive because that information 
appears, having regard to all the circumstances of the 
case, to be inadequate, irrelevant or no longer 
relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes of the 
processing at issue carried out by the operator of the 
search engine, the information and links concerned in 
the list of results must be erased.17  
Moreover, “it is not necessary in order to find such a right that the 
inclusion of the information in question in the list of results causes 
13 Google Spain SL, C-131/12, ¶ 14. 
14 Id. at ¶ 15. 
15 Id.  
16 Id. at ¶ 91. 
17 Id. at ¶ 94 (emphasis added). 
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prejudice to the data subject.”18 Specifically, the Court found that 
Costeja had established his right to be forgotten: “having regard to the 
sensitivity for the data subject’s private life of the information 
contained in those announcements and to the fact that its initial 
publication had taken place sixteen years earlier, the data subject 
establishes a right that that information should no longer be linked to 
his name by means of such a list.”19 The Court found no “particular 
reasons substantiating a preponderant interest of the public in having, 
in the context of such a search, access to that information.”20  
 The CJEU based its holding on the right of “rectification, erasure 
or blocking of data” under Articles 12(b) and 14(a) of the Data 
Protection Directive.21 In doing so, the Court recognized the immense 
power search engines have in assembling links to articles containing 
information about people in a way that creates a “detailed profile of 
him” that is “ubiquitous” on the Internet.22 Google “enables any 
internet user to obtain through the list of results a structured overview 
of the information relating to that individual that can be found on the 
internet.”23 The end result of the case (after a decision in 2015 from 
the Spanish court) was that Google removed the links to the articles in 
question from search results of Costeja’s name.24 After the CJEU 
decision, Google is no longer the sole decider of people’s profiles in 
Google searches of their names. People in the EU now have a right to 
remove certain links from searches of their names. 
18 Id. at ¶ 96. 
19 Id. at ¶ 98. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at ¶¶ 70, 76. 
22 Id. at ¶ 80. 
23 Id. 
24 See Spain: RTBF Prevails in High Court Ruling, DATA GUIDANCE, 
http://www.dataguidance.com/dataguidance_privacy_this_week.asp?id=3182 (last 
updated Jan. 28, 2015). Costeja’s victory was pyrrhic, at least for himself. Later, the 
Spanish data protection authority ruled that his right to be forgotten did not extend to 
subsequent negative comments published online regarding his legal case, given the public 
interest in the Court of Justice’s decision. See Miquel Peguera, No More Right-to-be-
forgotten for Mr. Costeja, Says Spanish Data Protection Authority, STANFORD CENTER FOR 
INTERNET AND SOCIETY BLOG (Oct. 3, 2015, 8:24 AM), 
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/10/no-more-right-be-forgotten-mr-costeja-says-
spanish-data-protection-authority. 
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B.  The Controversy and Potential Conflict Between Privacy and 
Speech 
 The CJEU’s decision sparked controversy as soon as it was 
announced. Some people hailed the decision as a victory for privacy.25 
Others criticized the decision as censorship.26 Several U.S. legal 
commentators argued that the right to be forgotten, if adopted in the 
United States, would violate the freedom of speech.27 Several 
Canadian legal commentators reached a similar conclusion for 
Canada.28 
25 See, e.g., Europe 1, Google 0: EU Court Ruling a Victory for Privacy, SPIEGEL ONLINE 
(May 20, 2014, 6:58 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/court-imposes-
right-to-be-forgotten-on-google-search-results-a-970419.html; Alan Travis & Charles 
Arthur, EU Court Backs ‘Right to Be Forgotten’: Google Must Amend Results on Request, 
THE GUARDIAN (May 13, 2014, 9:06 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/13/right-to-be-forgotten-eu-court-
google-search-results (“The ruling confirms the need to bring today's data protection rules 
from the ‘digital stone age’ into today’s modern computing world.”) (quoting EU justice 
commissioner, Viviane Reding). 
26 See, e.g., Matt Ford, Will Europe Censor this Article?, THE ATLANTIC (May 13, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/05/ europes-troubling-new-
right-to-be-forgotten/370796/ (“Is Google required to start censoring large swathes of the 
web? Are they required to build a complex censorship engine to block true information that 
a court has ruled must not be linked to? It’s crazy.”) (quoting Jimmy Wales, founder of 
Wikipedia); Dave Lee, What Is the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’?, BBC NEWS (May 13, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27394751 (“We need to take into account 
individuals’ right to privacy but if search engines are forced to remove links to legitimate 
content that is already in the public domain but not the content itself, it could lead to 
online censorship.”) (quoting Javier Ruiz, policy director of Open Rights Group); Olivia 
Solon, EU ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Ruling Paves Way for Censorship, WIRED.CO.UK (May 
13, 2014), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-05/13/right-to-be-forgotten-blog 
(“This decision is a ridiculous one that threatens to censor entire swathes of the web.”); 
Danny Sullivan, Thanks to “Right to Be Forgotten,” Google Now Censors the Press in the 
EU, MARKETING LAND (July 2, 2014, 4:11 PM), http://marketingland.com/eu-right-to-be-
forgotten-censorship-89783. 
27 See NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE 91-92 (2015); Toobin, supra note 5 (“The American regard for freedom of speech, 
reflected in the First Amendment, guarantees that the Costeja judgment would never pass 
muster under U.S. law. The Costeja records were public, and they were reported correctly 
by the newspaper at the time; constitutionally, the press has a nearly absolute right to 
publish accurate, lawful information.”). 
28 See Andre Mayer, ‘Right to Be Forgotten’: How Canada Could Adopt Similar Law for 
Online Piracy, CBC NEWS TECHNOLOGY & SCIENCE (June 16, 2014, 4:14 PM), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/right-to-be-forgotten-how-canada-could-adopt-
similar-law-for-online-privacy-1.2676880 (last updated June 18, 2014, 3:42 PM) (“David 
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 In the EU, the controversy raises a potential conflict between two 
fundamental rights: the right to privacy and the freedom of 
expression.29 The EU has allowed restrictions of speech—such as hate 
speech—which U.S. law does not allow.30 Given the EU’s approach to 
speech and restrictions, perhaps it was not surprising that the CJEU 
balanced the public’s interest in access to the information with the 
individual’s privacy interest in a right to be forgotten. 
 Other countries may not necessarily view the issue in the same 
way as the EU. In the United States, the right to privacy is less robust, 
so it is perhaps doubtful that it encompasses a right to be forgotten as 
a constitutional right.31 If it does not, Congress could create a statutory 
right to be forgotten, in which case the potential conflict would involve 
the constitutional right of free speech versus a newly created statutory 
right to be forgotten. Alternatively, courts could develop a right to be 
forgotten under the common law, although it does not fit neatly within 
the existing privacy torts.32 
                                                                                                                   
Fraser, an internet and privacy lawyer with the Halifax firm McInnis Cooper, doesn’t 
believe this could be implemented in Canadian law, because the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms ‘has a guarantee of freedom of expression—we don’t have a guarantee of your 
right to be forgotten.’”). 
29 See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Costeja, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at ¶¶ 58, 68 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&pageIndex=0
&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1033117 (privacy); Council of the 
European Union, EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and 
Offline (May 12, 2014), 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/documents/eu_human_rights_guidelines_on_freedo
m_of_expression_online_and_offline_en.pdf (“The right to freedom of expression 
includes freedom to seek and receive information.”) [hereinafter EU Human Rights 
Guidelines].  
30 See EU Human Rights Guidelines, supra note 29, at 27. 
31 See Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of the Fourth Amendment 
“Reasonableness”, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1643 (1998) (The Constitution does not 
expressly recognize a right of privacy, but the Supreme Court has recognized substantive 
privacy rights in the Due Process Clause of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
and a procedural privacy interest in the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
“unreasonable searches and seizures.”).  
32 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (identifying intrusion 
of an individual’s private affairs, public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, false light 
of an individual, and appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness as four privacy claims 
recognized under tort law). The right to be forgotten might be analogized to the tort for 
public disclosure of an embarrassing fact, but the right to be forgotten deals with public 
disclosures of personal information that is already published (and typically legitimately 
so), but later becomes excessive, inadequate, or outdated.  
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 Of course, one would expect such a RTBF law to face a First 
Amendment challenge. Google can assert a First Amendment right in 
its search results, a view supported by several district court 
decisions.33 Google could argue the right to be forgotten violates 
Google’s speech by forbidding it from displaying certain search results 
related to a search of a person’s name. Also, the publishers of the 
stories whose articles are delisted on Google from searches of a 
person’s name can raise a First Amendment challenge because the 
removal of links to their articles on Google makes it more difficult for 
people to find their articles. 
 Finally, members of the public could assert that their First 
Amendment rights have been infringed by the right to be forgotten 
because of the restriction on their ability to access publicly available 
information. The theory would be that once information is lawfully in 
the public domain, the government cannot restrict access to it. 
Although the underlying articles related to a person are still online, 
the public’s ability to find or access the information through a Google 
search is denied. The Supreme Court, however, has tended to avoid 
viewing First Amendment controversies in terms of a right to access 
the public domain or public records.34 In Golan v. Holder, a case in 
which Congress granted restored copyrights to foreign works that had 
been in the public domain, the Court rejected the argument “that the 
Constitution renders the public domain largely untouchable by 
Congress,” at least in the case of restrictions imposed by copyrights.35 
Several First Amendment cases recognize the right to publish 
33 See Zhang v. Baidu, 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 436-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 
474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629-30 (D. Del. 2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google Technology, Inc. 
2003 WL 21464568, at *3 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003). For commentary, see James 
Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868 (2014); Stuart Minor Benjamin, 
Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445 (2013); Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1495 (2013); Michael J. Ballanco, Comment, Searching for the First 
Amendment: An Inquisitive Free Speech Approach to Search Engine Rankings, 24 GEO. 
MASON U. C.R.L.J. 89 (2013); Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment 
Protection for Search Engine Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 883 (2012); Eugene Volokh & 
Donald M. Falk, First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results, 23 No. 1 
COMPETITION: J. ANTI. & UNFAIR COMP. L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 112 (2014); Oren Bracha & Frank 
Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of 
Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 (2008). 
34 See McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1718 (2013) (“This Court has repeatedly made 
clear that there is no constitutional right to obtain all the information provided by FOIA 
laws.”). 
35 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 891 (2012). 
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information that a person did not obtain unlawfully—such as from a 
public police report, judicial records, and even someone else’s illegal 
interception—but these cases are not framed in terms of the public’s 
right to access the information.36  
 Regardless of which type of challenger is involved, the conflict 
would involve an asserted First Amendment right versus a statutory or 
common law right to be forgotten. In this type of conflict, the freedom 
of speech may start out with an edge, given its higher status as a 
constitutional right. Constitutional rights, however, are not absolute.37 
So, just as in the case of a conflict between two constitutional rights, 
there is still a need to decide how to resolve the conflict. This conflict 
pits privacy against speech. 
II. THE METHODS OF RECONCILING OR RESOLVING THE CONFLICT 
BETWEEN THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN AND FREE SPEECH
 This Part lays out several methods that countries and companies 
can adopt to resolve potential conflicts between two individual 
rights—specifically, the right to be forgotten and the freedom of 
speech. This Part does not endorse any particular method, but, 
instead, is meant to illustrate the variety of alternatives available. The 
options are numerous and more nuanced than simply choosing one 
right over the other.  
A. Caveats 
 Before discussing how countries can resolve the conflict between 
the right to be forgotten and the freedom of speech, a few caveats are 
in order. The framework outlined below sets forth a general theory 
that is not tied to a particular country’s law. This general approach has 
limitations.  
 First, the text of the law in question, a court’s interpretive method, 
and a country’s jurisprudence all may influence—and possibly 
constrain—a court’s resolution of a possible conflict between two 
individual rights. For example, a constitution or treaty might say 
36 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 
524 (1989); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).  
37 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 
91 (1989) (“Because no constitutional rights are absolute, virtually every constitutional case 
involves the question whether the government's action is justified by a sufficient 
purpose.”). 
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nothing at all about such conflicts; the U.S. Constitution, for example, 
does not. By contrast, the law in question may anticipate potential 
conflicts and set forth guidelines on how to resolve such conflicts. 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
recognizes a freedom of expression that is qualified in the second 
paragraph:  
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it 
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.38 
The ECHR also recognizes limitations to the right of privacy: 
There shall be no interference by a public authority 
with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.39  
 The European Court of Human Rights has required any exception 
(1) to be set forth and circumscribed by law, (2) to be for one of the 
legitimate purposes listed in the paragraphs above, and (3) to be 
proportional.40 Although the ECHR is not EU law, the EU Charter 
38 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
art. 10, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 
1953) (emphasis added). 
39 Id. at art. 8 (emphasis added). 
40 See Amann v. Switzerland, 245 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 266 (2001); Francesca Bignami, The 
Case for Tolerant Constitutional Plagiarism: The Right to Privacy Before the European 
Courts, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 211, 219-20 (2008).  
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adopts a similar approach to limitations of rights in Article 52 and 
expressly treats corresponding rights in the ECHR as the same in 
meaning and scope.41  
 By contrast, U.S. courts have no guidance from the text of the 
Constitution on how to resolve potential conflicts among 
constitutional rights, and, arguably, may have greater discretion in 
resolving a potential conflict between two rights—such as speech and 
privacy, or the free exercise and the establishment of religion.42  
 Another factor that may influence the resolution of a potential 
conflict is the hierarchy, if any, of relevant laws. When two rights are 
both fundamental and constitutional, the court’s task may be more 
difficult because both rights are (presumably) of equal stature. 
Favoring one right over the other would seem to undermine the other 
right. By contrast, if one right has a higher status than another, such 
as a fundamental right versus a lesser right, or a constitutional right 
versus a statutory or non-constitutional right, a court might tend to 
favor the higher right. Yet, even in the latter type of conflict, most 
fundamental or constitutional rights are not considered absolute.43 So, 
a court must still consider whether the non-constitutional right passes 
constitutional scrutiny or is justified as consistent with or as an 
exception to the constitutional right.  
 Although the text of the law in question, a court’s interpretive 
method, a country’s jurisprudence, and hierarchy of law are all, 
undoubtedly, important in deciding how to resolve a potential conflict 
between individual rights, this essay puts aside these factors in the 
following analysis. Instead of examining a particular country’s law, the 
essay aims to speak generally about resolving a conflict between 
privacy (i.e., the right to be forgotten) and free speech—based on the 
assumption or expectation that many countries will face this same 
question. Nonetheless, the essay uses examples from the EU and U.S. 
for illustrative purposes. 
41 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 52 (1), (2), 2010 O.J. C 
83/389. 
42 See supra note 11. 
43 See Mark Rosen, When Are Constitutional Rights Non-Absolute? McCutcheon, Conflicts, 
and the Sufficiency Question, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1535, 1554-59 (2015); Stephen 
Gardbaum, A Democratic Defense of Constitutional Balancing, 4 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS 
78, 87-89 (2010). 
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B. Public Law Solutions 
 As depicted in Figure 1, countries can resolve the potential conflict 
between the right to be forgotten and the freedom of speech in a 
variety of ways. The first set of solutions involves state action setting 
forth a resolution by law. These solutions should be viewed as 
representing a spectrum of options with varying degrees of how rule-
like or standard-like they are.44 A rule sets forth the outcome in 
advance, while a standard allows greater discretion and decision 
making on a case-by-case basis.   
  Figure 1. Spectrum of Methods to Resolve Conflict of Rights 
44 There is extensive literature on rules versus standards. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules 
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, 
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-713 
(1976); Frank I. Michelman, A Brief Anatomy of Adjudicative Rule-Formalism, 66 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 934, 936-37 (1999); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101 (1997); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. 
L. REV. 781 (1989); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175, 1176 (1989); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword—The Supreme Court, 1991 Term: The Justices of Rules 
and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 27-56 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with 
Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 956-57 (1995). 
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1. Trump in Favor of One Right 
 The simplest solution to any conflict between the RTBF and free 
speech is to favor, as a categorical rule, one right over the other. This 
resolution can be characterized as a trump. One right trumps the 
other.45  
 If the RTBF always prevails, then the trump may limit free speech 
by limiting (1) search engines’ search results, (2) access to publishers’ 
articles, and (3) people’s access to a link to an article containing 
personal information of the person invoking the RTBF.  This trump 
does not destroy or deny people’s free speech right altogether. People 
still retain their free speech rights, although their access to certain 
links resulting from Google searches of certain people’s names may be 
more limited.46 The CJEU came close to adopting this categorical 
approach by describing the RTBF as a “rule”: 
As the data subject may, in the light of his fundamental 
rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, request 
that the information in question no longer be made 
available to the general public by its inclusion in such a 
list of results, it should be held, as follows in particular 
from paragraph 81 of the present judgment, that those 
rights override, as a rule, not only the economic 
interest of the operator of the search engine but also 
the interest of the general public in finding that 
45 The “rights as trumps” idea was a large part of Ronald Dworkin’s influential theory. See 
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR 
HEDGEHOGS 329 (2011). For a critique of Dworkin’s theory, see Rosen, supra note 43, at 
1543-53. 
46 Some groups have tried to counter RTBF removals by collecting, identifying, and 
publicizing links that have been removed from Google. See, e.g., Jeff John Roberts, 
“Hidden from Google” Shows Sites Censored under EU’s Right-to-Be-Forgotten Law, 
GIGAOM (July 16, 2014), https://gigaom.com/2014/07/16/hidden-from-google-shows-
sites-censored-under-eus-right-to-be-forgotten-law/. The UK data protection authority 
subsequently ordered Google to remove links to news articles that reported some of the 
links Google had already removed pursuant to RTBF requests. See Samuel Gibbs, Google 
Ordered to Remove Links to ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Removal Stories, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 
20, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/20/google-ordered-to-
remove-links-to-stories-about-right-to-be-forgotten-removals.  
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information upon a search relating to the data subject’s 
name.47  
In the very next sentence, however, the Court backed away from the 
“rule” and instead recognized a need to consider the countervailing 
interest of the public in accessing the information in the article: 
“[T]hat would not be the case if it appeared, for particular reasons, 
such as the role played by the data subject in public life, that the 
interference with his fundamental rights is justified by the 
preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of 
inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in question.”48 
As discussed later, Google has interpreted the decision to require case-
by-case balancing of interests.  
 By contrast, if free speech always prevails, it destroys or denies the 
RTBF altogether. Privacy survives as a general right, but it is 
powerless to command, by law, a search engine to remove a link from 
a search of a person’s name for RTBF reasons. In other words, the 
RTBF is just not possible if free speech always prevails. Critics like 
Professor Jonathan Zittrain, who argue that the RTBF would violate 
the freedom of speech in the U.S., envisage free speech as a trump.49 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent does lend some support for this view, 
with the Court tending to favor free speech over privacy in most, if not 
all, cases in which the two interests have been implicated.50 
47 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Costeja, 2014 E.C.R. 317 at ¶ 97, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&pageIndex=0
&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1033117 (emphasis added). 
48 Id. 
49 See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, Don’t Force Google to “Forget”, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2014, 
http://nyti.ms/1gppWAR. 
50 The Court has tended to favor the publication of speech over privacy or confidentiality 
interests. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001); The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 
491 U.S. 524, 533 (2000); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979); 
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Cox Broadcasting Corp. 
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
(per curiam). In these cases, the Court typically applies strict scrutiny to the restriction of 
speech. See, e.g., Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528 (requiring a state “need … of the highest order” 
before the state can punish publishing truthful information on a matter of public concern). 
Although these cases stop short of holding that free speech generally trumps privacy, the 
results have all favored free speech over privacy interests. See RICHARDS, supra note 27, at 
47.
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2. Presumption in Favor of One Right 
 Closely related to the first approach is a country’s recognition of, 
not a trump, but a presumption in favor of one right that may be 
rebutted or departed from in some cases. The presumption, itself, may 
be strong, medium, or weak. A strong presumption would mean that, 
in most cases, the right favored by the presumption would prevail. A 
weak presumption, on the other hand, would allow a greater number 
of departures. 
 A strong presumption may be viewed as a trump, subject to an 
exception for exigent circumstances. Some of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence follows this approach.51 The 
Court typically leaves open the possibility for an exception even while 
recognizing a strong protection for the freedom of speech.52 In most 
cases, free speech prevails. By contrast, a weak presumption allows 
more varied outcomes. The reasons for departure may be less exigent, 
but may, nonetheless, provide a sufficient basis to override the 
presumption in favor of one right.  
3. Catalogs of Situations with Certain Outcomes 
 A third way to deal with the potential conflict between the RTBF 
and free speech is to enumerate a catalog of factors or factual 
scenarios that produce certain outcomes.53 This third approach 
mirrors the earlier two approaches (trumps and presumptions), but 
on a micro level. Instead of resolving the conflict across the board on a 
macro level, the third approach decides the issue factor-by-factor, or 
factual scenario-by-factual scenario. 
51 See, e.g., Smith, 443 U.S. at 102 (“[S]tate action to punish the publication of truthful 
information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.”). 
52 See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (“Rather than 
address the broader question … whether the State may ever define and protect an area of 
privacy free from unwanted publicity in the press, it is appropriate to focus on the 
narrower interface between press and privacy that this case presents, namely, whether the 
State may impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim 
obtained from public records….”).  
53 For a theory to justify the use of catalogs, see Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, 
Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 168 (2015) (“A catalog, as it is defined in this Essay, 
consists of an outright ban on a detailed, but incomplete, list of specific activities and a 
general prohibition of all activities falling into the same category.”). 
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 For example, imagine that a country decided that the RTBF 
trumped free speech in the following scenarios:  
1. The link is to an article over five years old that
discusses how the individual or her family was the
victim of a crime of violence;
2. The link is to an article that discusses an individual’s
serving of a prison sentence, even though the
individual has served the entire prison term in a
country that recognizes expungement of criminal
records upon completion of prison terms; or
3. The link is to an article that discusses an embarrassing
act committed when the individual was a minor.
 Thus, for each factor, the RTBF effectively trumps whatever free 
speech rights exist in the link to the information resulting from a 
search of a person’s name. The catalog of factors essentially operates 
as a set of trumps, each for a specific scenario. Conversely, we can 
enumerate a list of factors that operate as trumps in favor of speech, 
such as whether the person is a public figure or official, or whether the 
issue involves a matter of public concern. 
 Alternatively, instead of trumps, the enumerated factors could be 
considered presumptions subject to exceptions. The exceptions 
themselves may be enumerated in advance. For example, the first 
factor above might be subject to an exception if the individual or 
individual’s family included a public figure. As Figure 1 above depicts, 
trumps, presumptions, and catalogs fall along a spectrum that is more 
rule-like in approach, with trumps operating as the most rule-like. 
Trumps, presumptions, and catalogs set forth outcomes in advance to 
respectively decreasing degrees. An absolute trump should result in 
100% the same outcome for every case, no matter the circumstance. 
Presumptions and catalogs, on the other hand, will favor one right 
over the other, but in less than 100% of the cases. 
4. Case-by-Case or Open-Ended Decision Making
 The fourth way to reconcile the conflict between RTBF and free 
speech is to delegate the decision for a tribunal to decide on a case-by-
case basis. Of the four approaches, this approach leaves open the 
greatest discretion for the court or tribunal to decide the conflict for 
each claimant. Instead of resolving the conflict ex ante for a broad set 
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of cases, the resolution of the controversy is left to each individual 
case. This approach is often characterized as a resort to “standards.”54  
The case-by-case method can be purely fact-specific, leaving the 
tribunal to decide each case simply on the facts. More commonly, 
though, the case-by-case method is informed by a list of factors that 
the tribunal should consider in each case. For example, in deciding the 
RTBF, one may consider the nature of the information, how old the 
information is, and whether it involves a public figure on a case-by-
case basis. 
 By the available accounts, the process that Google has adopted 
most closely resembles the case-by-case method guided by a list of 
factors.55 Google’s external Advisory Council proposed a list of factors 
for Google to consider, as did the EU’s Article 29 Working Party.56 
Google’s approach appears to be justified by the CJEU’s decision, 
which stated that one must determine if the information is 
“inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant” by “having regard to all 
the circumstances of the case.”57 Still, it appears that, from its 
experience in case-by-case decision making, Google has also 
developed a body of case law—what it calls “a rich program of 
jurisprudence”—that may lend itself to the recognition of a catalog of 
fact scenarios that produce certain outcomes in favor or against the 
RTBF claim.58 From a free speech standpoint, case-by-case standards 
may be more troubling if they do not give adequate notice to the 
public on what is proscribed, thereby leading to a chilling of speech or 
54 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
55 See Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right 
to Be Forgotten, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017, 1037-40 (2016). 
56 See Report of The Advisory Council to Google on the Right to Be Forgotten, GOOGLE 
(Feb. 6, 2015), https://drive.google.com/a/kentlaw.iit.edu/file/d/0B1UgZshet 
Md4cEI3SjlvV0hNbDA/view; Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de 
Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja Gonzalez”, C-131-12 ARTICLE 29 DATA 
PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, Nov. 26, 2014. 
57 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Costeja, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at ¶ 94, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&pageIndex=0
&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1033117. 
58 See Natasha Lomas, Call for Google to Show Its Right to Be Forgotten Workings, 
TECHCRUNCH, May 14, 2015, http://techcrunch.com/2015/05/14/call-for-google-to-show-
its-right-to-be-forgotten-workings/ (quoting Peter Fleischer, Google Global Privacy 
Counsel). 
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self-censorship, or if they give too much discretion to the decision 
maker, resulting in arbitrary decisions. 
C. Solutions by Private Norms and Ordering 
 The second set of solutions consists of private solutions selected by 
Google or other companies on their own, without the command of law. 
This approach may be more suitable for countries that do not already 
recognize a RTBF by law. Instead of a country recognizing a RTBF by 
law, Google and other companies can recognize a private RTBF in 
their policies, practices, or technological design. One advantage that a 
private solution yields is that it avoids state action. Thus, if, as in the 
United States, the right to free speech does not apply to speech 
restrictions by private actors, a private solution may offer a way to 
strike a balance between privacy and speech without raising any 
constitutional problem.59 Even in those countries where a RTBF law 
would violate free speech rights, a private RTBF, voluntarily adopted 
by companies, may present a viable alternative. Of course, private 
restrictions on speech or private censorship may be troubling in their 
own right (or even prohibited in some countries), so it is still 
necessary to debate the desirability of a private RTBF along with its 
feasibility. 
1. Best Practices on Privacy and Speech 
 Instead of the state resolving the potential conflict between the 
RTBF and free speech, companies could resolve the conflict on their 
own. The search engines would have the same range of options as 
states do to resolve the conflict—by using trumps, presumptions, 
catalogs, or case-by-case decision making. If a company adopted a 
trump, presumption, or catalog as its policy, it probably would be hard 
for the company to avoid some level of case-by-case decision making 
in order to process requests, unless the search engine incorporated its 
approach into its algorithm for the search results. 
 Private solutions to legal controversies are common in other 
contexts. For example, in several countries, the movie and music 
industries have convinced Internet service providers to adopt 
voluntary agreements that impose “graduated response” or “six 
strikes” policies on their users who allegedly engage in copyright 
59 See Christopher Witteman, Information Freedom, A Constitutional Value for the 21st 
Century, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 145, 227 (2013). 
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infringement.60 Although these graduated response policies are 
controversial, they represent a private ordering response to copyright 
infringement that operates outside the dictates of copyright law, the 
First Amendment, and the courts.  
 Closer to the RTBF issue, media companies in the United States 
have several longstanding, voluntary policies that probably would 
violate the freedom of speech if they were enacted by the state. First, 
the movie industry in the U.S. adopted a ratings system for movies 
starting in 1930, which restricts children’s and teenagers’ access to 
movies based on their content.61 The current ratings system is 
administered by a private agency, the Classification & Rating 
Administration (CARA).62 Second, nearly all U.S. newspapers and 
news organizations have voluntary rape shield policies, according to 
which they will not disclose or broadcast the names of victims of rape 
(even if the information is publicly available from court 
proceedings).63 Both the movie ratings system and the media’s rape 
shield policy are well-accepted industry practices today that probably 
few people object to. If a law required entities to adopt such policies in 
the U.S., the law would likely violate the freedom of speech.64 Without 
state action, the industry policies currently in force avoid this 
constitutional difficulty.65 
 Thus, a private solution to the RTBF-free speech dilemma may 
offer an alternative to RTBF laws that a country deems to violate free 
speech. Even if a country concludes that a RTBF law is an 
unconstitutional abridgment of speech (i.e., free speech trumps the 
60 See Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online 
Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV. 81 (2010). 
61 See Jacob Septimus, The MPAA Ratings System: A Regime of Private Censorship and 
Cultural Manipulation, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 69 (1996); Roy Eugene Bates, Private 
Censorship of Movies, 22 STAN. L. REV. 618 (1970). 
62 See Who: About Us, THE CLASSIFICATION & RATING ADMINISTRATION (CARA), 
http://filmratings.com/who.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).  
63 See Deborah W. Denno, Perspectives on Disclosing Rape Victims’ Names, 61 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1993). 
64 For a discussion of the Supreme Court decisions invalidating government restrictions on 
movies, see Bates, supra note 61, at 620 n.17. For the Court’s analysis of rape shield laws, 
see The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 
U.S. 469 (1975). 
65 See generally, John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis, 
83 N.C. L. REV. 569, 577-87 (2005) (discussing Supreme Court’s state action doctrine). 
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RTBF), such a ruling would not necessarily end the need for public 
debate over the wisdom of a policy that a company could adopt on its 
own accord. 
2. Technological Solutions: De-Ranking 
 Google and other companies can also attempt to address the 
RTBF-free speech dilemma through a technological solution, such as 
the design of the algorithm for their search engines. Zittrain, while 
critical of a legal RTBF, suggested a technological solution: Search 
engines could allow people whose name matched a particular search 
to curate the first page of search results, but subsequent pages of that 
search would include all the other listings of links that the search 
currently generates.66 
 Another option I propose is for the search engine to program its 
algorithm to consider certain factors (e.g., private figure, victim of 
crime, etc.) that, if present, push the link to an article progressively 
lower and lower (i.e., “de-rank”) from a search of a person’s name that 
is contained in the article. In this way, the search results have a built-
in “reverse chronological” order, in which the most recent articles 
tend to have priority in the search results.  
 A link to an old article could still be found from the search, but, 
over time, it would fall off the first page of search results and would 
progressively fall lower—for example, after seventy years, to page 
seven of the results of a search of a person’s name. The “reverse 
chronological” option could be made either automatic or contingent 
on a request by that individual. For example, the algorithm could de-
rank links to an article that identified a person as a victim of a crime of 
violence five or ten years after the article was published. The 
algorithm could provide an exception for public figures (whose names 
the algorithm could probably identify based on the sheer volume of 
references to the name online, although it would be harder if a private 
figure had the same name as a public figure). The search results could 
remain unaffected unless the person affirmatively requested to Google 
the de-ranking option. 
 In both Zittrain’s and my solution, the change in algorithm does 
not remove the link to an article from a search result of a person’s 
name. Instead, it de-ranks it from the first page of search results. My 
approach goes further than Zittrain’s by de-ranking the link 
66 See Zittrain, supra note 49. This idea is similar to the right of reply proposal by Frank 
Pasquale. See Frank Pasquale, Asterisk Revisited: Debating a Right of Reply on Search 
Results, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 62 (2008). 
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progressively over time. The result under either approach is a 
compromise between privacy and speech: the person affected by the 
link will no longer have the story be one of the first search results 
people see in “googling” her name, but the public can still find the 
story with some diligence in scrolling through the search results. The 
de-ranking solution makes the story harder, but not impossible to 
find.  
III. HOW GOOGLE CAN RECOGNIZE A LIMITED RIGHT TO BE
FORGOTTEN IN THE U.S. 
 Now that we have examined a range of possible approaches to 
resolving the conflict between the right to be forgotten and the 
freedom of speech, it is worth evaluating whether any of the 
approaches would work in the United States. Without foreclosing the 
adoption of one of the other approaches, this final Part recommends 
that Google adopt a limited right to be forgotten for people in the 
United States as a matter of its user policy based on an incremental 
approach that recognizes the need for further study.67 This approach 
offers a sensible way to implement such a right in the United States, 
while also respecting free speech interests. 
A. Google’s Revenge Porn Precedent 
 In June 2015, about one year after the Costeja decision, Google 
announced a big change to its user policy on removing links from 
Google searches. The change applied to people in the United States 
and elsewhere—specifically to victims of revenge porn.68 Revenge porn 
occurs when a person publishes nude photos of an ex-lover to exact 
revenge. Female victims of revenge porn have reported experiencing 
harrowing ordeals from having nude photos of them follow them in 
Google searches of their names.69 
67 It goes beyond the scope of this essay to evaluate each approach for the United States. I 
have selected one approach as a way to show how a right to be forgotten could easily be 
implemented, without violating the freedom of speech.  
68 Amit Singhal, “Revenge Porn” and Search, GOOGLE PUBLIC POLICY BLOG (June 19, 2015), 
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2015/06/revenge-porn-and-search.html. 
69 See Emily Bazelon, Why Do We Tolerate Revenge Porn?, SLATE, Sept. 25, 2013, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/09/revenge_porn_legislation_a_
new_bill_in_california_doesn_t_go_far_enough.html. 
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 The change in policy marked an important shift in Google’s 
approach. Google has been relatively unreceptive to any privacy 
requests by users to change search results, except for a limited class of 
personal information: signatures, bank accounts, and other sensitive 
ID information.70 In those limited circumstances, Google will allow a 
delisting of a link from search results. Google has also allowed de-
ranking of search results containing mug shots of people, as well as 
sites with repeated notices of copyright infringement.71 Otherwise, 
Google tended to follow its credo of having its search “reflect the 
whole web.”72  
 The change in policy for revenge porn illustrates how Google itself 
can implement a sensible policy recognizing a limited form of the right 
to be forgotten online for countries outside the EU. A month after 
Google announced its policy, Microsoft did the same for its search 
engine, Bing.73 While some media characterized the move as 
“censorship,”74 there was no public uproar or people clamoring for a 
right to access revenge porn. Thank goodness.75  
 I take it as a fair assumption that most people would agree with 
the soundness of Google’s revenge porn policy. If this assumption is 
correct, then it establishes a useful precedent that shows that, in some 
70 See Search Help: Removal Policies, Personal Information, GOOGLE, 
https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/2744324?hl=en (last visited Aug. 18, 
2015). 
71 See Barry Schwartz, Google Launches Fix to Stop Mugshot Sites from Ranking: Google’s 
Mugshot Algorithm, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Oct. 7, 2013), 
http://searchengineland.com/google-launches-fix-to-stop-mugshot-sites-from-ranking-
googles-mugshot-algorithm-173672; Danny Sullivan, The Pirate Update: Google Will 
Penalize Sites Repeatedly Accused of Copyright Infringement, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Aug. 
10, 2012), http://searchengineland.com/dmca-requests-now-used-in-googles-ranking-
algorithm-130118.  
72 See Singhal, supra note 68 (“Our philosophy has always been that Search should reflect 
the whole web.”). 
73 See Patrick Howell O’Neill, Microsoft Joins Google in Censoring Revenge Porn, THE 
DAILY DOT (July 22, 2015), http://www.dailydot.com/politics/microsoft-ban-revenge-
porn-bing-xbox-live-onedrive/. 
74 See Associated Press, Google Expands on Unprecedented “Censorship” Policy, N.Y. 
POST, June 21, 2015, http://nypost.com/2015/06/21/google-cracks-down-on-revenge-
porn/. 
75 As discussed above, there is no potential First Amendment violation, given the lack of 
state action in Google’s voluntary policy. 
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circumstances, searches should not reflect the whole web and that 
people should have the ability to request removals of certain 
objectionable links from searches of their names. 
B. Moving Beyond Revenge Porn 
 The revenge porn precedent raises the question whether there are 
other circumstances in which people should be allowed a right to be 
forgotten as a matter of Google’s policy. This section proposes one 
additional situation and recommends further study on others. The 
idea would be that Google could learn from its experience in handling 
RTBF claims in the EU and identify whether certain classes of cases 
warrant a change to its removal policy in other parts of the world. 
1. Protecting Victims of Crimes 
 Google should adopt a limited right to be forgotten for victims of 
domestic violence, rape, incest, kidnapping, sex trafficking, and other 
horrific or traumatic crimes. This approach adopts the catalog 
approach and sets forth specific circumstances in which the right to be 
forgotten will be recognized. It avoids the open-ended, case-by-case 
approach and the potential problem of arbitrary decisions. 
 Under its policy, Google should recognize a right for victims of 
crime to request links to articles, related to the crime they suffered, to 
be removed from searches of their names. The victims of such crimes 
should not have to endure articles about the crimes they suffered 
haunting them on Google for eternity. I do not give a full defense here 
for this victims’ right, but I believe it comports with the goals of the 
longstanding victims’ rights movement in the United States, which 
attempts to treat victims with fairness, respect, and dignity in the 
criminal process.76 My proposal extends this goal to life beyond the 
criminal process, when victims may still suffer the consequences of 
the crimes they suffered. 
 Take, for example, Kiri Jewell. Starting at the age of ten, she was 
repeatedly raped for several years by Branch Davidian cult leader 
76 See Symposium, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model, 
1999 UTAH L. REV. 289, 294 (1999). For a history of the crime victims’ rights movement in 
state and federal law, see Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating 
Victims Into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 861, 865-70 
(2007). 
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David Koresh in Waco, Texas.77 Her rape was widely reported by the 
media due to her testimony before Congress regarding her ordeal.78 
Most of the links on the first page of a Google search of her name 
relate to her sexual abuse as a child—some of the articles are twenty 
years old.79 Under my proposal, she would have a right to request that 
Google remove the links to these stories from a search of her name. 
This result still leaves all of her testimony before Congress and the 
articles about her and her rape online.80 So a person could still 
discover information about Jewell’s rape from a general search of the 
Davidian controversy or David Koresh,81 but at least the rape would 
not be what defined her on Google. 
 2.  Further Study of Other Situations Warranting a Right to Be 
Forgotten and Other Relief 
 Google and others should engage in further study of other 
situations that may warrant a right to be forgotten in the United 
States. The policy itself should incorporate a reflective, incremental 
approach that relies on study and reassessment of the policy over 
time. The government can also play an important role in making 
nonbinding recommendations to industries, as the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) currently does with its recommended fair 
information practice principles (notice, choice, access, and security) 




79 See id.; “Children of Waco” Speak Out, ABC NEWS, Apr. 15, 2003, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/story?id=131982; TSShow, Tom Snyder 950731 Seg 2 
+ WCBS Break, YOUTUBE (Feb. 22, 2009), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mUTzNV9gx5I (interview of Kiri Jewell, her father, 
and her stepmother); Glenn F. Bunting & David Willman, Waco Hearings Open; Girl Tells 
of Forced Sex, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-07-
20/news/mn-26050_1_david-koresh. 
80 For example, a Google search of “David Koresh Congress” produced the same July 20, 
1995 CHICAGO TRIBUNE article about Kiri Jewell as the last result on the first page of 
results. See Google (search: “David Koresh Congress”) (last visited Aug. 25, 2015).  
81 Id. 
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for companies to adopt.82 One study suggests that the FTC’s fair 
information practice principles influenced the development of privacy 
policies, especially among large websites after the FTC’s 
recommendation in 1999.83 This example suggests that the FTC could 
develop a nonbinding RTBF recommendation that would influence 
the search engine market, which is dominated by a few large entities, 
especially Google. 
 I recommend that Google and policymakers consider several other 
situations for possible inclusion in a limited, voluntary right to be 
forgotten: (1) embarrassing photographs and comments involving 
minors on social media and (2) convictions that have been ordered 
expunged by a court. On the first issue, Google search chief Amit 
Singhal agreed that teenagers in the United States should have a right 
to be forgotten for some of their mistakes.84  More controversial would 
be recognizing a similar right for adults. As discussed above, I also 
recommend that Google consider de-ranking search results (the 
“reverse chronological” order option), but not removing them in 
certain cases. For example, perhaps embarrassing content related to 
minors should receive a removal, whereas embarrassing content 
related to adults could receive only a de-ranking of the search 
results—the idea being that society affords kids greater leeway than 
adults.  
CONCLUSION 
 The EU right to be forgotten is a new privacy right (or a new 
application of privacy to Internet search engines) that has sparked 
great controversy around the world. As more countries consider 
adopting such a right, the controversy will only intensify. This Essay is 
intended to map the various alternatives that countries and search 
engines have in reconciling the potential conflict between the RTBF 
and the free speech interest in access to information. The solutions are 
far more varied than the all-or-nothing assumption implicit in the 
82 See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic 
Marketplace, A Report to Congress (2000), available at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2015). 
83 See Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
2041, 2047 (2000). 
84 Shara Tibken, Google Search Chief: Users Have Right to Be Forgotten Online in Some 
Cases, CNET, Oct. 8, 2015, http://www.cnet.com/news/users-have-the-right-to-be-
forgotten-online-in-some-cases-google-search-chief-says/. 
2015] LEE 111 
 
 
media’s portrayal of the issue. In the conflict between privacy and free 
speech, there does not necessarily have to be a loser. 
 
  
